CASE STUDY CONCEPT: Strategy and Logistics are Two Sides of the Same Coin.
“There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war.” – Carl von Clausewitz
The path taken by the German Army in its advance on Moscow in the summer of 1941 was largely dictated by considerations of supply and logistics. The regional transportation network of railroads and paved highways existing at that time had three major hubs that controlled the movement of supplies: Minsk; Smolensk; and Moscow (circled in red in the screenshot below). So German campaign strategy called for the capture of Minsk and Smolensk as necessary stepping stones to support the advance on Moscow.
Minsk was captured as planned in the first two weeks of the invasion, and at the end of the third week the German Army was poised to take Smolensk, its next objective. Army Group Center was responsible for this drive on Moscow. It was following a tight timeline in order to advance quickly, and be in Moscow before the severe Russian winter set in. In the screenshots above and below the German and Russian units are shown in their starting positions at the beginning of the battle.
Supply Considerations Shape Campaign Strategy
The battle occurred in the region around the city of Smolensk over a period of two months (it was planned to take two weeks). The German Army had already advanced 500 km (300 miles) into the USSR in the previous three weeks. German strategy was based on blitzkrieg tactics using fast and continuous movements of armored vehicles and motorized infantry combined with close air support to keep the enemy confused, disorganized and retreating. Strategy based on blitzkrieg depends on continuous deliveries of supplies to support continuous movement of troops and vehicles.
Strategy and logistics are two sides of the same coin. Every strategy requires a supply chain to make it possible. The supply chain that supported Army Group Center’s attack on Smolensk (5) is shown on the screenshot below. It began with two main supply depots in Prussia (1) and Poland (2). Minsk at the center of the road and rail networks (3) was a forward depot. There was also a captured Russian oil refinery and fuel depot (4) that provided much needed gasoline, although the gasoline had to be further processed to meet German requirements. German units participating in the battle are labeled on the map in the screenshot below.
NOTE: This is an advanced case. Work through the three challenges of the beginning case, “Cincinnati Seasonings” before taking on the challenges in this case.
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German and Russian units are displayed at the corps level in this case study. Each corps is composed of two or more divisions and a division has 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers (gray warehouse icons represent German corps units; gold store icons represent Soviet armies that were the equivalent of corps units).
From the screenshot above and the map below you can see the positions of the German units at the start of the battle, and the movements of those units during the battle. The arrows show where each of the German units went.
(click map for larger image) Courtesy of Livedawg, Wikimedia Commons, 6 Dec 2013,
Campaign maps such as this make a dramatic impression with their sweeping arrows showing troops and vehicles surging across the landscape. Yet it is important to remember that behind those arrows there are supply lines (also known as lines of communication) that make those movements possible. Without supply lines, combat units in those arrows will run out of food, fuel and ammunition in a few days. Then all movement comes to an abrupt halt. Thus the saying, “Amateurs talk strategy, and professionals talk logistics.”
In the map above, the two biggest movement arrows are 39th Corps and 47th Corps. The screenshot below shows what happens when these two units are not supplied with the increased amounts of fuel they need in order to carry out their assigned missions. Both units run out of fuel and come to a halt on day six of the battle. The simulation shows more vehicles are needed to deliver the extra fuel these units require. Supply lines need to be reconfigured, and vehicles redeployed to better meet requirements of the combat units, or else this battle plan is not going to work.
[NOTE: This is an ADVANCED LEVEL case study – work through the beginning case study, Cincinnati Seasonings, before attempting to work with this case.]
[The newest version of the Battle of Smolensk logistics model in the library is updated to show military unit icons.]
Estimates of Supply and Demand
This case study is based on information presented in the book Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, 2nd Ed, 2004, by Martin Van Creveld. In Chapter 5, “Russian Roulette”, Van Creveldt describes the logistics operation that supported Army Group Center in the battle of Smolensk. Van Creveld states that logistics support for the German units in the battle was provided by captured Russian railroads and by three German truck transport regiments. He presented the data below which is used to model these entities in this case study:
- Freight rail cars reflect the weight restrictions of Russian railways which used a smaller gauge and freight car size than what was used by the German railways. Russian freight cars carry 450,000 kg and have a volume of 1,100 m3. Average speed including loading and unloading is 35 km/hr
- A transport regiment consists of: 3,000 soldiers ; 2,200 trucks with cargo capacity of 4.5 metric tons (4,500 kg) and 40 m3 each; average truck speed including loading and unloading is 320 km/day or about 27 km/hr.
- Daily fuel needs for a transport regiment are estimated at 50 tons, and 25% of a regiment’s trucks are assumed to be out of service because of breakdowns or enemy action during the battle
German combat units involved in this battle consisted of six German Army corps that made up Army Group Center. Each corps consisted of two or more divisions (Wikipedia – 2nd Panzer Army). These units and their estimated daily needs for supplies are shown below:
- 39th Corps – 3 Motorized divisions
- 5th Corps – 3 Non-motorized divisions
- 9th Corps – 3 Non-motorized divisions
- 47th Corps – 3 Motorized divisions, 1 Non-motorized regiment
- 46th Corps – 3 Motorized divisions
- 24th Corps – 2 Motorized divisions, 2 Non-motorized divisions
- Each corps has internal vehicles to move supplies from main corps supply dump to its divisions and regiments
- DAILY NEEDS – Motorized armored or infantry division: Food – 75 tons; Fuel – 150 tons; Ammunition – 75 tons
- DAILY NEEDS – Non-motorized infantry division: Food – 75 tons; Fuel – 50 tons; Ammunition – 75 tons
Modeling the German Supply Chain
In this case study we explore a supply chain modeled at the army group and corps level in order to study the overall logistics that supported the battle. This supply chain model shows the movement of supplies from army group supply depots well behind the front lines to army corps units engaged in combat. We focus first on finding ways to deliver adequate supplies to each corps before considering how those supplies would then be further distributed to lower level units within a corps.
The German supply chain is modeled by combinations of four types of entities placed on the map: (1) Products; (2) Facilities; (3) Vehicles; and (4) Routes. Examples of these entities from the model are shown below. Data for these entities is gotten from Van Creveld’s book, and data for any of the entities can be changed as needed if better information is available.
The screenshot above shows data for the four entities that constitute a segment of the supply chain from Minsk to 5th Corps:
- Products – size and weight of a shipping container loaded with ammunition (other shipping containers are defined for food and fuel)
- Facilities – storage capacity, internal product demand, and amounts on-hand at the Minsk Supply Depot (production of food at a facility represents food acquired locally)
- Vehicles – cargo volume and maximum weight, speed of a vehicle representing 550 medium trucks, and frequency of vehicle departure on its delivery route
- Routes – round trip time and distance on the delivery route taken by those 550 trucks running between Minsk and 5th Corps; plus the amounts of different products they drop off at 5th Corps.
Army group supply depots are shown with the depot icon, and army corps units are shown as warehouses placed where those units locate their main supply dumps. This model assumes each army corps has its own internal vehicles to move supplies from its supply dump to lower level units (divisions, regiments, etc). The daily product demand numbers shown for a corps represent the combined demand from all the divisions and regiments in that corps.
NOTES:
- To further explore supply chain operations within a single corps, a lower level model can be built that begins with the main supply dump for a corps and shows the vehicles and routes that move those supplies to the divisions, regiments, and battalions within that corps.
- That model would start with the main supply dump for the corps. That facility would produce amounts of products equal to the products delivered to it as shown in this higher level corps model.
- But remember, you must first create a successful corps level supply chain before you can address lower level (division, regiment, battalion) supply chains. If a supply chain doesn’t work at the corps level, then it won’t work at the division or regiment level either.
- Since this case focuses on the German supply chain, the logistics of the Russian army units are not considered. Russian army units are positioned in their starting positions but no numbers are entered regarding their daily demands for products nor is the supply chain shown that supported those Russian units. You can change that if you wish.
- When you click on those Russian units you see they have been set up with a nominal on-hand amount for products, but since there is no demand and no supply chain to deliver more products, the units show no change in their inventory levels during the simulation. However, Russian Army product demands and supply chain vehicles and routes can easily be added to this model. See section at the bottom of this case study titled “Wargaming Option“.
See more in our slide brief – view online or download PDF, “M&S Techniques for Logistics Planning and Decision Support,” presented at Military Operations Research Society (MORS) annual symposium at USMA, West Point, June 2023.
FIRST CHALLENGE:
Get supply chain to run for 15 – 30 days
Imagine you are in charge of logistics for Army Group Center during the battle for Smolensk. Import the “Battle of Smolensk – 1941” supply chain model from the online library and open it up in your Edit screen to inspect the model. Click on the menu tabs for Products, Facilities, Vehicles, and Routes. Select entities in those menus and look at their data. Zoom in on some of the facilities and switch to the satellite view to study them and their surroundings more closely. Zoom in and look at the German main supply depots at Brest Litovsk and Gumbinnen. Look at the captured Russian fuel depot at Baranovichi. Notice they are all located next to major railroad lines and freight yards (facilities shown in the satellite views today are similar to what existed in 1941).
Then click on the “Simulation” button to see how well this supply chain works. A second browser tab opens showing the Simulate screen. Click the “Play” button. See trucks and trains running on their routes, and see real time data displays on the right side of the screen showing day to day inventory levels for different supplies. As the simulation is running click on some of those data displays for German supply depots and combat units to see the trends in the on-hand amounts of different supplies. You see various product inventories are trending up and others are trending down at different facilities representing army depots and combat units. Then on the sixth day (as shown below) the German 39th Corps and the 47th Corps both run out of fuel.
The first thing you need to do is get this simulation to run for at least 15 days, but not more than 30 days (because nobody knows what the situation will be beyond 30 days anyway). You need to reassign trucks to different routes to support product delivery requirements, and you’ll need to make changes to vehicle delivery schedules (change the “Delay Between Departures” number for different vehicle entities).
Keep trying things to see what works. Flip back and forth between your two browser tabs with the Edit screen and the Simulate screen. Make changes to the supply chain model in the Edit screen, then flip to the Simulate screen and run a simulation to see how it performs. As you do this you will build an intuitive understanding (mental model) of how this supply chain works. The better your intuitive understanding, the more you will be able to come up with effective solutions for problems discovered.
Try Different Courses of Action (COAs) and Generate Mission Reports to Evaluate COAs
Think about using both trucks and trains (and maybe airplanes) to transport supplies. Do you have enough trucks to transport needed supplies? Are the current railroad freight cars being used effectively? How would you rearrange the trains and their delivery schedules (delay between departure) to move more products? Where would trains be the best mode of transport, and where would trucks be better? Why?
Hint: Maximize the use of rails for the long haul between rear supply depots and Minsk. Concentrate available trucks at Minsk for use in delivery to combat units. As you do this you don’t need to create new vehicles in the model – just change the numbers of vehicles (rail cars or trucks) represented by each vehicle on routes where you are re-allocating vehicles. Trucks shifted from one route can be reflected in the numbers of trucks running on other routes. After re-allocating the rail-truck mix on different routes, you may still need to add more of each kind of vehicle. Model this by increasing the number of trucks or rail cars represented by an existing vehicle. If you do need more vehicles, how many more trucks and rail cars do you need beyond the amount initially available in the supply chain model?
Thinking Out of the Box: Consider using a new type of vehicle such as the Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft. Do some research to estimate how many such aircraft might have been available in the spring of 1941 on the Eastern Front. Where would you base them and how would you use them? Create some new facilities for airports. You can select existing airports or you can select appropriate open fields or lengths of road that are large enough for a airport (turn on the satellite view and zoom in and find these locations). The specifications for a Ju 52 are: Speed – 240 kph; Carry Vol – 80 m3; Max Weight – 2700 kg. The Ju 52 had a range of about 1000 km. Define new vehicles that represent squadrons of 10 Ju 52s each. How much of an impact would 15 squadrons make?
When you get a simulation that runs for 15 – 30 days it means you have successfully created a logistics plan, or course of action (COA), that will support Army Group Center in this battle for a couple of weeks or a month. Congratulations!
However, you have a good solution only if everything goes according to plan. And as the saying goes, “No plan ever survives contact with the enemy.” In the second challenge (see below) we’ll explore redesigning these supply chains and logistics plans to respond as events unfold and the campaign progresses.
Download your simulation data to create mission reports showing supply chain costs and performance levels. Use these reports to analyze your simulation data and make improvements to your supply chain design. You can download a mission reporting template for this case study here: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uEjApg7Gik1FA27Wk7wgPK1Ihq5gJYC4FyKhgthtwOo/edit?usp=sharing
[If you are using SCM Globe Professional version, mission reports can be generated automatically by clicking on the “Generate P&L Report” button on the Simulate Screen]
NOTES FOR USING THE MISSION REPORTING TEMPLATE — In addition to the original P&L report and KPIs, there are new features and tabs in the Mission Reporting template as described below:
- Ordering cost – an estimate of how much it costs an organization to place an order, receive the order, issue payment and put away the inventory delivered. Different organizations have different ordering costs; estimates can range from $15 to $150 or more. Industry trade associations can provide data on average ordering costs for companies in their industries, or your company may already have an ordering cost it uses for EOQ calculations. The template uses a default cost of $35.00.
- Annual holding costs – often estimated at 20% of product price. Industry trade associations can provide data on average annual holding costs for companies in their industries.
- EOQ Delivery Amount and Frequency — these features use data from the supply chain model plus the ordering cost and holding costs to apply the Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) equation to suggest an amount and frequency for product deliveries to different facilities. The numbers are only suggestions and often need to be adjusted, but they provide a starting point. See more about this in the online guide section “Cutting Inventory and Operating Costs“, scroll down to the heading “Use Economic Order Quantity to Calculate Delivery Amounts and Frequencies”
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS — Prepare a short presentation outlining the challenges you encountered and the actions you took to respond to those challenges.
- Explain why you did what you did, and use screenshots and data from your simulations to illustrate what you did and your reasons for doing so.
- Download your simulation data and produce a Supply Chain Cost & Performance Report and KPIs – how well does your supply chain perform?
- How many additional trucks and rail cars did you need in your model to make it work?
- Use examples from this case study to illustrate how strategy and logistics must work together to deliver mission success.
- See “Analyzing Simulation Data” in the online guide for an explanation of how to export simulation data to spreadsheet reporting templates.
TIP: Save Backup Copies of your supply chain model from time to time as you make changes. There is no “undo”, but if a change doesn’t work out, you can restore from a saved copy. And sometimes supply chain models (.json files) become damaged and no longer work, so you want backup copies of your supply chain to restore from when that happens.
To share your changes and improvements to this model (json file) with other SCM Globe users see “Download and Share Supply Chain Models”
SECOND CHALLENGE:
Adjust supply chain as campaign progresses
If you refer back to the battle map above you can see the movements made by each of the combat units. On that map you can see where each unit ended up at the end of the battle 60 days after the battle began. Assume that after the first 2 – 4 weeks, some of the combat units need to establish new supply dumps to support their advancing troops.
Different corps will have different needs. Some corps traveled long distances (like the 39th Corps and the 47th Corps), and other corps (like the non-motorized 5th Corps and 9th Corps) did not travel so far. For corps that did not travel far, it may not be worth setting up new supply dumps. But for those motorized corps that did travel long distances, it is necessary to establish new supply dumps that are located half or even two thirds of the total distance those corps advanced over the course of the battle.
This means you need to find good locations for these new supply dumps – places well served by road and rail lines. Look for good locations on the map and zoom in and switch to satellite view to see more detail on specific locations. Select locations for the new supply dumps and create new facilities at those locations. Then re-route some portion of the vehicles delivering products to the old supply dumps to deliver products to the new supply dumps.
And while all this setting up of new supply dumps is going on, each corps still needs to deliver supplies to its divisions and regiments engaged in the battle. So for a period of time supplies from both the old and the new supply dumps will be supporting combat units. Divide the total product demand that existed at the original supply dump between the new dump and the original dump. Assign half of the product demand to the new dump and half to the original dump. When new supply dumps open you can assume they already are stocked with products to cover 2 days of demand.
Then run simulations to see how well the new supply chain works. Get the new supply chain to run again for 15 — 30 days. It will take some tinkering and adjusting to get the new supply chain to work. As you figure these things out you’ll get an appreciation of what is involved in supporting an army in the field. It’s a lot harder than it might have seemed at first.
Do you have enough truck and rail transport capability to support the needs of the combat units? How can you best employ what transport capability you do have? If you could request more trucks and trains how much of each would you request?
Mission and Operations Planning (M&OP)
There is a lot to think about in this second challenge. This calls for a simple but effective organizing framework and process for gathering the data and building your supply chain model for this second phase of the operation. The Mission and Operations Planning process (M&OP) is an organizing framework to guide your logistics planning. See case study “Syria Evacuation Scenario” for an illustration of how to use the M&OP process. As you move on to more challenging and realistic cases such as the Syria Evacuation Scenario, or missions in the real world, you will need to employ a framework such as M&OP to help you get organized and think clearly under conditions of stress and uncertainty.
** NOTE: Another organizing framework for use with this case is the US DoD Joint Planning Process as presented in the JP 5-0 publication (December 2020). The Joint Planning Process is explained in Chapter III Joint Planning Process. See the diagram showing the seven steps of the JPP on page III-4. These step are similar to the five steps of the M&OP framework.
For more ideas on building and improving this supply chain check sections in this online guide such as:
MISSION REPORTING TEMPLATE — There is a reporting template for this case study that you can download. It has an operations report and a performance dashboard for analyzing your simulation data. The template is built for a 15-day period, and you can extend it to cover more days if you wish. Use it to analyze your simulation data and make improvements to your supply chain design. Download a copy of the template here – https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/17c08CvrIv-a3hHelV-DPfUE6OFPi26-O9SfGNgPDv9c/edit?usp=sharing
[If you are using SCM Globe Professional version, mission reports can be generated automatically by clicking on the “Generate P&L Report” button on the Simulate Screen]
PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS — Van Creveld states in his book (pg. 152) that the German high command recognized, “the Russians would have to be defeated within the first 500 km (300 miles) if they were to be defeated at all…” German commanders believed after pushing 500 km into Russia they would need to pause the offensive for a few months to allow for the buildup of large new supply depots inside Russia to support their continued advance. From what you learned in this case study can you explain why German commanders might have felt this way? Can you see how this might have been difficult to explain to senior political leaders and others who did not (or would not) appreciate the impact of logistics on this campaign?
Prepare a short presentation outlining the challenges you encountered and the actions you took to respond to those challenges. Explain why you did what you did, and use screenshots and data from your simulations to illustrate what you did and your reasons for doing so. Use examples from this case study to illustrate how strategy and logistics must work together to deliver success.
What strategy would you recommend for the capture Moscow? List the transport capacity and numbers of vehicles needed to support your strategy. Use simulations to illustrate how your proposed supply chain can support the campaign strategy.
HISTORICAL NOTE
The German Army did win this battle, but it encountered unexpected resistance from the Russian Army. The battle was originally planned to take a couple of weeks during which time the Russian Army was to be encircled and destroyed. But instead it became a battle that took a couple of months, leading to a serious delay in the German advance on Moscow. And a significant number of Russian troops escaped from the German encirclement of Smolensk, and continued their fight to defend Moscow.
As the German Army advanced further and further into Russia, its supply chains were stretched, and stretched again. Supply units struggled and often failed to keep up with the demands of their combat units. This crippled the use of blitzkrieg tactics, and undermined their campaign strategy which depended on those tactics. As the war continued, the German Army confronted the reality that if supply cannot keep up with demand generated by their tactics, then tactics must change to fit within available supply. And given the change in tactics, the challenge was then to find a campaign strategy that was able to accomplish the mission of capturing Moscow.
Now 80 years later, the experience of the Russian Army in its invasion of Ukraine is teaching us once again how battle strategy and logistics are two sides of the same coin. The Russian Army’s campaign strategy for the invasion of Ukraine employed modern blitzkrieg tactics to make a sudden drive on the Ukrainian capital in order to capture it and key Ukrainian political and military leaders in the first few weeks of the war (much as the Germans had done in Poland at the beginning of WWII). But the Russian supply lines could not support the demands of their advancing combat units. Supply lines were degraded by Ukrainian resistance and Russian units ran out of food, fuel, and ammunition. Movement came to a halt. Resupply was not reliable and after a few months they had to withdraw, at times abandoning hundreds of tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces for lack of fuel. Russian strategy had to change to a strategy their logistics capabilities could support. Russian strategy switched from movement and maneuver to a more static and defensive strategy.
Working with professors and students at the Air Force Institute of Technology, in the spring of 2022 we modeled and simulated Russian supply chains in Ukraine and explored different strategies the Russians could employ to continue their invasion. Several of these models are available in the SCM Globe library for download and use. We wrote about this in a blog post, “Russian Logistics for the Invasion of Ukraine“. And we co-authored an article that was published by the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point – “Logistics Determine Your Destiny”
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WARGAMING OPTION:
Combine wargames and supply chain simulations
Every strategy (or concept of operations – CONOPS) needs a supply chain to support it, and every military supply chain is built to support some strategy. Strategies define the military units involved, where they will be located, and what their product demands will be. Add supply chain simulations to quickly see if a particular strategy is viable given the supply chain capabilities available to support that strategy. SCM Globe simulations show if enough supplies can be delivered to all units over the time period a strategy is employed.
There are commercial and instructor-developed wargames that teachers of history and military strategy use to reenact and simulate historic battles, or explore potential future battles. Philip Sabin in his book, Simulating War, makes a powerful case for using map-based wargames to study conflicts and strategies. But because these wargames focus primarily on strategy and tactics they leave the handling of logistics to a few abstract rules that only hint at the real logistics challenges. Wargames need to add accurate logistics without adding extra complexity or slowing down the pace of game play.
In this example we’ll use a well known, commercially available wargame that models the German invasion of Russia in the early phase of World War II. Shown below is, “Panzergruppe Guderian: The Battle for Smolensk, July 1941“. This is a map-based wargame, and SCM Globe is a map-based supply chain simulation. That makes it easy to add a supply chain component to this wargame. Supply chains like those described in the challenges above complement the movement of combat units on the game board below. This quickly shows if those combat units will get the supplies they need to carry out their assigned movements. This adds accurate logistics without adding complexity or slowing down the pace of game play.
Teams compete by playing the opposing sides in a wargame such as this. One team plays the German side and the other team plays the Russian side. Each team has both a Combat Operations Group (known as G3) and a Logistics Group (known as G4), and they have to work together to support the overall campaign strategy. Each team has to coordinate their combat operations and their supply chain performance in order to win.
The Operations Group (G3) in each team can only make moves that simulations show can be supported by their respective supply chains for some period of time; assume two weeks. The Logistics Group (G4) in each team adjusts their supply chain model to support the moves made by G3. Simulations show if a supply chain can support those moves. Based on simulation results, G4 adjusts their supply chain to get the performance needed to support combat operations. And maybe sometimes G4 finds they can’t support combat operations as called for by G3, and battle plans need to be changed.
The opposing teams have to tailor their campaign strategies to meet their logistics capabilities. Teams learn to adjust their campaign strategies and their supply chain operations so that both work together. In this gaming and simulation exercise people come to see that strategies and supply chains are two sides of the same coin. Or as Carl von Clausewitz put it, “There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war.”
CASE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: We would like to thank Professor Philip Sabin in the War Studies Department of King’s College London for his assistance in creating this case. His book Simulating War: Studying Conflict Through Simulation Games is a big influence on the design of this case study, and the evolution of the SCM Globe application user interface (UI).
Register on SCM Globe to gain access to this and other supply chain simulations. Click the blue “Register” button on the app login page, and buy an account with a credit card (unless you already have an account). Scan the “Getting Started” section, and you are ready to start. Go to the SCM Globe library and click the “Import” button next to this or any other supply chain model.